The late, distinguished Dr. Roger Fisher, longtime faculty leader at Harvard Law School, once made a study of why the human race and nations, despite clear options to agree, often miss solutions by a New York mile because of ignoring one or more of these requirements for success: 1) Communication 2) Relationship 3) Interests 4) Options 5) Legitimacy 6) Commitment and 7) Alternative.
Dr. Fisher also was among authors of a hoary little business manual, “Getting to Yes” which details scutwork involved in getting opposing sides in a lawsuit to agree.
My issue with his conclusions is simple: his premises require the initiator of discussions to be in psychological combat mode, and to see the other side and their position as “the enemy.” While this may play well if deployed on an international stage before observant newscasters, staring gimlet-eyed across the table at one’s counterpart in another nation’s hierarchy is not likely to produce a second invitation to lunch, or an offer to share dim sum (appetizers) at the appropriate hour.
But one has to begin somewhere. Many years ago China, or rather, the military/civil Communist rulers of China, had resurrected a vast, ancient kingdom and turned it on its head: the proletariat were now in charge, and China was expecting to become truly great again. “The East is Red!” was their national anthem, but their near neighbor to the north – also stridently Communist - was restive, and a rival.
Over a generation ago, no one could foresee the future, and Mandarin subtleties were dismissed during these last years of Soviet chest-beating. Stalin had given Manchuria to the Chinese – now, his successors seemed to want it back.
Consulting quietly among themselves, the gentlemen (and few ladies) of high counsels in Beijing concluded that, since Russia was being so “Russian!”, they had best look for safer but unpublished alliances with the West. Specifically, with the United States. Tentative, hush-hush calls went back and forth to and from the White House through the customary four intermediaries, and the Oval Office phone rang just when Henry Kissinger and his disciple President Nixon were thinking of scoring some coup to outweigh the decades-long debacle of Viet Nam.
Never mind that America was seen in the East as a notorious bully and the Viet war as racist. The Chinese, needing a relationship counterbalance to the noisy Russians and their own inconvenient ties to Ho Chi Minh, were unbothered by such things if advantage was to hand. It was. Washington, uneasy at echoes of “We will bury you!” from Moscow, could not pack its bags fast enough.
In one of the grandest gestures in the annals of diplomacy, President and Mrs. Nixon, Kissinger and various entourages got on Air Force One, deplaned in the ancient land of Kublai Khan, and proceeded to charm their hosts with adept management of chopsticks and blandishments of cultural interchange. Mao Zedong, hoary architect of Asian Communism, was pleased – the mountain had finally come to Mohammed, and he was fully acknowledged as the builder of a new eastern power.
At the closing banquet, so goes the story – pressed duck was on the menu. Nixon, ever practically minded, knew that the Chinese would be surprised and impressed at his hastily-learned phrases in Mandarin, and held forth with a ringing toast. Difficult as the intonations were, he carried off some tricky compliments to the cook, the setting, and all things admirable about collective farms.
Polite applause, nods and smiles followed, upon which Henry Kissinger, master of Metternich and Von Clausewitz, rose from his seat to intone a sonorous, German-inflected thanks which caused eyebrows to involuntarily rise and quiet kicks under the tablecloth from senior to junior staffers, suppressing mirth.
I am told the National Security Advisor had somehow compared the Chairman’s mother to an inedible roast chicken. Chinese-American relations survived, entering into a period of cordial exchanges of academics and agronomy. Viet Nam treaties were signed, Saigon celebrated in what was left of the city, saber-rattling ceased and the dreaded Soviets – which no one had predicted - subsided for a time.
Then Beijing remembered that the issue of Taiwan’s subjection and reaffiliation with Mainland China was still unacknowledged. While it is simplistic to say that the Chinese just want our attention to their claims, it seems each time NATO or the U.S. scores a gain on the world stage, Dr. Fisher’s first four requirements for a mutual “win” being satisfied - China now demands legitimacy and our recognition of “One China,” or else.
The Russian homeland, struggling with ignominy and impotence of a stalemated, losing war with Ukraine, is an offstage factor this time. But we have a signed, solid treaty with Taiwan from old days of the postwar Kuomintang, which the U.S. cannot honorably ignore until most of Taiwan’s citizens decide to recommit to the Chinese Mainland. The alternative? Hold your hat – there’s choppy waters ahead.
Linda Berry is a Northsider.
